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
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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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**SOVIET MUSLIM POLICY:
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGES**

by

Edward A. Corcoran

30 April 1980

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Pat Bonneau.

FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD A. CORCORAN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1978 after a tour as materiel officer at an ammunition depot in Korea. An ordnance officer with a background in missiles and special weapons, he holds a doctorate in political science from Columbia University and is a member of the Foreign Area Officers Program specializing in the Soviet Union. Past assignments have included service in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Headquarters, US Army Europe, and as a liaison officer to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in East Germany.

SOVIET MUSLIM POLICY: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGES

Islam is a potent influence in the modern world, providing some 700 million Muslims¹ a code of social organization whose adherents live in constant awareness of their allegiance. Although split into two major divisions—the majority Sunnis and the generally more fundamentalist Shiites—it forms a strong cultural bond between the Islamic nations.² In the last decade, with the growing political power of oil and then spurred by Iran's revolution, the belt of Islamic nations, stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, has become a major force on the international scene.³ It is also the portion of the international environment most directly connected with the Muslim population of the Soviet Union.

This paper will focus on the linkages between the Islamic nations and the Soviet Muslims, and how those linkages affect the relations between the Soviet Muslims and their own government, and between the Soviet government and the total international environment. These linkages will be discussed in terms of the actors involved—individuals, unofficial groups and government organizations or institutions—and the outputs which specific actors

make in various settings and which, in turn, serve as inputs for other actors. The outputs will be identified as direct if they are intended to bring about a response from another specific actor, as when an individual sends a request to an official organization. Indirect outputs, on the other hand, occur when activities of one actor elicit an unintentional response, as when the cultural activities of one group inspire another group to produce its own artistic creations.⁴

THE SOVIET MUSLIMS

Ethnic groups with a Muslim cultural heritage constitute the largest non-Slavic element in Soviet history.⁵ As discussed below, they are a cohesive and dynamic segment of this society and their continued social and political development poses a number of fundamental dilemmas for the Soviet leadership, dilemmas which have wide implications for the Soviet political structure and for its foreign policy.

Internally, the Muslims are the most rapidly expanding segment of the Soviet population. They will provide a significant proportion of Soviet manpower by the close of this century.⁶ It is unclear whether this will result in increased industrialization of Central Asia or increased pressures on Muslims to relocate outside their traditional homelands, nor is it clear whether the resolution of this problem will increase or decrease Muslim commitment to the Soviet system. At the same time, the growing educational qualifications of the Muslim population threatens to bring them into direct competition with Slavic settlers in Central Asia for a limited number of desirable jobs.⁷ Whether this can be resolved without exacerbating ethnic tensions is questionable. What is clear is that Soviet Muslim policy will have profound effects on the entire Soviet system.

Externally, the Soviet appeal, particularly to the Third World, is heavily based on its claim to provide a developmental model for the emerging nations. Central Asia is the showplace of this model because of its many similarities with the Third World and its shared heritage with the Islamic nations of the Middle East and South Asia. Third World delegations to the Soviet Union are constantly being given tours of this region, and Central Asians are prominent in Soviet delegations to emerging nations. As a result of these direct and officially sponsored linkages, developments in Soviet Central

Asia are directly relevant to Soviet relations with the Third World. Conversely, as contacts with the Third World increase, Soviet Muslims become increasingly aware of alternative methods of handling some of the same problems which they face, so Third World policies have an indirect linkage with Soviet Central Asia.

EARLY SOVIET MUSLIM POLICY

The Soviet Muslims are basically of Turkic and Iranian stock, with some admixtures from the Mongol hordes of the 12th and 13th centuries. Linguistically and ethnically they are related to the indigenous populations of Xinjiang (Sinkiang), Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. Their Muslim heritage derives from Persian and Arabic sources; consequently their written languages generally used Arabic script prior to the Soviet period. Among some of the ethnic groups the Muslim influence dates from as early as the 7th century and is strongly ingrained in the traditional culture. Among other groups, it is of more recent origin and more superficial impact.⁸

The Soviet domination of Central Asia derives from the Tsarist eastward expansion which began in the 17th century. The main thrust of this expansion was into Siberia, and so it first brought the Tatars and Bashkirs, straddling the southern Urals, under Russian domination and subsequently the northern lowland areas of Central Asia. By the time of the 1917 revolution, Tsarist imperialism had established domination over the entire region from the Transcaucasus to the Pamirs, eventually colliding with British interests in Afghanistan and Chinese interests in Xinjiang.⁹

While the final defeat of the White forces in July 1919 established Soviet domination of Central Asia, gaining control was no easy task. The Red Army insured the absorption of the nominally independent People's Republics of Khiva and Bukhara into the Soviet Union and the suppression of their national Communist elements, but armed conflict in the area did not end until the early 1930's when the Basmachi opposition, representing the traditional Muslim leadership, was finally crushed.¹⁰

Although Soviet policy of the 1920's and 1930's included the suppression of private industry, the establishment of firm Communist Party control over local political, economic and social life, and the forced collectivization of farmers, it also included some significant concessions to Muslim sensitivities, including the

establishment of nominally autonomous territorial ethnic republics and the toleration of many aspects of the Muslim culture. Political control was established by co-opting native elements into the local party and government posts, while retaining key posts in the hands of ethnic Slavs. By a series of alternating recruitment campaigns and purges, the Soviets were able to offer social mobility to ambitious elements of the local population. From them, they developed a local elite which not only had strong vested interests in the maintenance of the system, but also was entirely beholden to Moscow for their position. Furthermore, by assuming the positions of earlier purged elites, the new local elites were implicated as beneficiaries of the earlier purges.¹¹

Culturally, the Soviets moved to cut the ties of Soviet Muslims with their ethnic brothers outside the Soviet Union. Borders were sealed and heavily patrolled, physically cutting off linkages with neighboring Muslim countries. The traditional Arabic script was replaced, first by Latin script and then by Cyrillic. Major achievements of earlier Turkic and Iranic cultures were claimed for the predecessors of the Soviet ethnic groups, emphasizing their cultural heritage as decidedly superior to that of the neighboring areas and thus undermining any grounds for establishing external cultural linkages. Muslim religious practices were suppressed, eliminating much of the influence of the Muslim clergy and stopping pilgrimages of Soviet Muslims to shrines outside the Soviet Union. The slightest expressions of pan-Muslim or pan-Turkic sentiments were ruthlessly exterminated.¹²

Soviet basic nationality policy envisioned the temporary flowering of major nationalities as they absorbed minor nationalities and carried out the economic and political development of their territories in preparation for an eventual merging into a single (largely Russian) "multi-national Soviet people." One visible manifestation of this policy was the formation of nominally independent republics for the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmen and Azerbaidzhanis with local autonomous entities set up for some of the larger remaining groups, such as the Tatars, Bashkirs and Karakalpaks. To some extent this produced an artificial fragmentation of the region, insuring against the development of a single cohesive national group while simultaneously undermining the viability of many smaller cultural units. Adopting the Russian language and culture became a prerequisite for advancement. Typically, members of the titular

nationality held the leading positions in the local party and government, but they would invariably have Russian (or occasionally Belorussian or Ukrainian) deputies closely watching them and also filling lesser key posts, such as the local Minister of the Interior in charge of police operations. Slavs dominated the organizations with actual political power (such as the bureaus of the local central committees).¹³

Economically, there was a heavy investment in regional development and industrialization, with Central Asians generally supplying unskilled and semi-skilled labor, while Russians and Ukrainians provided the skilled labor and management expertise. This brought about a significant influx of Slavic elements who were heavily concentrated in the cities. Simultaneously, a massive educational program was set in motion, producing a steady stream of native technicians who were readily absorbed into the expanding industrial establishment. Industrial development of the area received a further impetus during World War II, when many industries were relocated from European portions of the Soviet Union.¹⁴

CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE SOVIET MUSLIM POLICY

The basic Muslim policies established in the 1930's have been followed into the 1970's. However, there have been tremendous changes in Central Asia and in Soviet society as a whole during this period. Some very fundamental problems in Central Asia are acquiring an increasing urgency; significant changes appear inevitable during the coming decades.

Probably the most fundamental change is the growing pressure for participation within the Soviet system. The relative backwardness of the Muslim nationalities has been largely eliminated and can no longer serve as a primary justification for Slavic domination of local political and economic life nor for practical exclusion of Muslim elites from the actual power centers in Moscow. Furthermore, the developing Muslim elite is no longer as dependent upon Moscow as its predecessors of the 1940's and 1950's were, nor is it implicated as the direct heir of the purges of the 1930's. As such, it is more inclined to assert its own interests and press for a larger voice in the system. The results are apparent throughout Central Asia. In 1976, for example, Uzbeks actually

gained a majority in their Central Committee Bureau (holding 6 of 11 posts, compared to only 5 of 14 posts in 1949).¹⁵ Similar change is evident on a broad statistical scale in Communist Party membership and membership of party bodies at all levels.¹⁶ At the center, too, such shifts are visible; the Politburo itself now contains three Central Asians.

With Russians constituting barely 50 percent of the total Soviet population, the trend toward wider participation of other ethnic groups in the political process could change the basic political forces in the Soviet system. But actions to reverse this trend and reassert Russian or Slavic ethnic discrimination could alienate minority groups, particularly the cohesive Muslim minority, and produce strong tensions in Soviet society.

Economically the development of Central Asia has been impressive. Not only has there been a tremendous increase in agricultural production (cotton output has increased tenfold over prerevolutionary levels), but there has been widespread industrialization, with capital input far exceeding profits or goods extracted from the area. Education levels have improved dramatically; cultural, housing and sanitary development is widespread, and extensive medical services are free.¹⁷

The figures look all the more impressive when compared with neighboring countries. Measures of economic growth (say, electricity production or per capita income) unquestionably favor the Soviet republics, as do gross measures of social services (such as student enrollments, literacy rates, infant mortality, or the numbers of doctors or hospital beds per thousand inhabitants.)¹⁸

The costs associated with this development are much harder to measure. Much of the traditional Muslim way of life has changed, but to some extent this is necessary for modernization and hardly unique to the Soviet Union. More pervasive is Moscow's control of the local life. Whatever the benefits of this rule, it has taken freedom of political choice from the indigenous population.¹⁹

Furthermore, the comparisons with the past, although undeniably impressive, are somewhat inflated—they usually use the very poor years around 1913 as the base for comparison. And of course, while comparisons with some relatively underdeveloped nations are favorable, comparisons with other regions (e.g., Japan, Korea) and with the industrial countries are not so favorable. More importantly, comparisons with most other sections of the Soviet Union are also unfavorable. Despite all the advances, Central Asia

remains basically a supplier of raw material to the rest of the Soviet Union. Local industrialization is heavily centered on textile production; there is very little heavy industry, and electrification lags noticeably behind other areas. Education levels also lag, particularly when one considers that Russians and other settlers account for a disproportionate share of the overall student population and of the number of Central Asian residents with higher education.²⁰

Population dynamics seem bound to exacerbate these problems. During the 1980's, the increases in the local Soviet labor pool will come from the Muslim ethnic groups of Central Asia. They will provide far more labor than the projected level of Central Asian industrialization will be able to absorb. Nevertheless, there is still a continuing influx of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.²¹ There are two serious implications of these trends. First, competition for local jobs, especially for the better paid ones requiring skilled labor, can be expected to increase significantly. The very visible disproportion of Slavs in these positions may well fuel a growing resentment.²² Secondly, many other areas of the Soviet Union have projected labor shortages, and there are already indications of pressures to move the excess Central Asian labor to these areas. However, the Muslim ethnic groups have been very reluctant to move outside their traditional homeland areas, increasing the potential for aggravated tensions.²³

Overall then, by comparison with neighboring countries or with its own past, Central Asia has shown a very impressive development; the Soviet authorities work hard not to let the indigenous population forget that. Nevertheless, there are costs to this development and latent dissatisfaction over the relatively privileged position of Slavic settlers. Demographic trends indicate that there will be strong pressures for change in the 1980's. If the Soviet government is able to convince large numbers of Central Asian workers to move to the other areas of the Soviet Union, while allowing a continued influx of Slavic workers into this area, there could be a significant mixing of the Soviet population and a strong push to the development of the multinational Soviet people which is sought by official nationality policy. On the other hand, if a more modest out-migration from Central Asia is not balanced by significant increases in local industrialization, this could exacerbate latent anti-Russian feelings and result in a dramatic increase of ethnic tension.

Culturally, there has been a steady growth in the use of Russian as a second language by the Muslim ethnic groups. Recent Soviet conferences indicate even more emphasis is to be expected in this area, raising possibilities that linguistic Russification will undermine local languages.²⁴ However, in many cases linguistic Russification is at best superficial; it does not necessarily undermine one's ethnic consciousness, as clearly shown by a number of Central Asian authors who write in Russian but with a high regard for their own cultural antecedents.²⁵ In general Soviet Muslims are now showing a broad interest in their cultural heritage, as seen in such phenomena as the increase of historical literature in Uzbekistan,²⁶ appeals for the wider publication of the Kirghiz epic *Manas*,²⁷ and the humanist emphasis in Central Asian cinema.²⁸ Indeed, native language development seems to have gained a momentum of its own and has become a vehicle of cultural revival throughout the Soviet Union.²⁹

The Soviet Muslims have generally shown a strong sense of ethnic identity and a dogged resistance to cultural assimilation.³⁰ Even small ethnic communities which are no longer officially recognized (as the Khorezm Turks) have retained their distinctiveness.³¹ At the same time, there is a growing recognition of the common cultural heritage of the Central Asian nationalities and their ties with Muslim elements abroad.³²

This cultural tenacity also extends to the religious elements of the Muslim heritage. While formal religious organization has been largely suppressed, Muslim religious practices remain strong and the Soviet press still mounts regular attacks on Islam as a support of reactionary social elements.³³

One further complication is the growth of political dissent in the Soviet Union, dating from the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial of 1966. Since then a wide range of dissident groupings have been established, many inspired by nationalist and religious sentiments, with Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians and Georgians prominent among them. Although the authorities have taken stern measures against the dissidents, they have been unable to eliminate the protests. On the contrary, they have seen the individual and initially isolated groups amalgamate into an informal network centered on Moscow intellectuals but loosely coordinating dissident groups from Leningrad to Yerevan. This has encouraged a degree of mutual support and initiated an unprecedented rise in publicity

with hundreds of appeals to foreign organizations and governments and a phenomenal growth of uncensored typescript manuscripts usually referred to as samizdat ("self-published," in imitation of typical Soviet publishing house acronyms).³⁴ With two exceptions, this dissent has barely touched the Muslim population, there being only infrequent references to individual protests. The two exceptions, though, are significant ones, involving the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks.

The Crimean Tatars are one of the nationalities suppressed *en masse* by Stalin. On the night of May 18, 1944, the entire Tatar population on the Crimea (approximately 200,000 persons) was herded into collection stations and forcibly deported to a Central Asian exile. As a result of this deportation, 46 percent of the entire Crimean Tatar population perished.³⁵ After Stalin's death, the Crimean Tatars began a campaign for exoneration and received a formal rehabilitation in a decree of September 5, 1967; they were not, however, permitted to return to their traditional homeland, even though the Crimea (now a part of the Ukraine) is a labor deficit area. Practically the entire Crimean Tatar population has been mobilized in support of this objective, with individual petitions signed by tens of thousands. The authorities have responded with long prison terms for their leaders, forcible expulsion of those families who do return to the Crimea, dispersal of gatherings of Crimean Tatars, and official de-nationalization (census counts now lump the Crimean Tatars with the Volga Tatars, even though there is no common origin for these two widely separated peoples.)³⁶ Being concentrated in Central Asia, the movement of the Crimean Tatars has relatively high visibility among wide segments of other Muslim elements and presents a clear picture of ethnic discrimination. Although there have been few indications of support from the other Muslims, there is a definite potential for the Crimean Tatar example to spark dissent among larger Central Asian ethnic groups.

The second exception is the Meskhetian Turks. They are likewise a deported ethnic group, originally native to the Georgian-Turkish border area and forcibly displaced to Central Asia on November 15, 1944. Their campaign parallels that of the Crimean Tatars, though on a smaller scale. One noteworthy aspect of the Meskhetian situation is that they were never accused of anti-Soviet activities, but moved presumably because of potential ties with the Turks.

Indeed, they have shown an apparent readiness to seek assistance from the Turkish government; at least one of these appeals reportedly resulted in some Soviet concessions.³⁷

Overall, Soviet Muslim policy has had very mixed results. On the one hand, it has had impressive success in mobilizing a hostile and heterogeneous population in a very undeveloped area, bringing about a tremendous improvement in education levels, an impressive degree of industrialization and a standard of living visibly higher than in neighboring countries. It has generally eliminated a number of degrading discriminatory social practices, particularly in regard to the status of women. On the other hand, the growth of a common Soviet patriotism is now threatened by a dynamic interest in local culture. Pressures for full economic and political quality could threaten the Russian hegemony of the entire Soviet system. Two dissident Muslim groups have set examples of determined quest for recognition which would be decidedly destabilizing if they spread to larger ethnic groups. These conflicting tendencies make it appear likely that there will be significant changes in Central Asia in the coming decades, but the direction of these changes is not yet set.

EXTERNAL IMPACT OF SOVIET MUSLIM POLICY

Understandably stressing the positive aspects of Central Asian development, the Soviets tout the superiority of their model of development. To many in the Third World, the impressive change in Central Asia speaks for itself as proof of these Soviet claims, even though the Soviets themselves have been unable to express the tangled, chaotic and often improvisational development of Central Asia in anything resembling a coherent model. Furthermore, several aspects of Central Asian development which can be considered as negative (such as the suppression of independent political opinion) are probably seen as positive by revolutionary leaders seeking to solidify their own power base. Nevertheless, Third World leaders are often hesitant to adopt many Soviet practices, and try to develop alternate approaches to problems of development.

The net result is that Soviet relations with Third World countries often have their reflection in Central Asia. A review of specific aspects of Soviet relations with individual countries and regions will make these implications more concrete.

China

Soviet relations with China have deteriorated significantly since the early 1960's, bringing tension and conflict to their inner Asian border, stretching from Mongolia to the Pamirs. This is one of the most remote areas in the world and unbiased information on conditions there is very scarce. Nevertheless, the general situation can be outlined. The Chinese side of this border is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, whose indigenous population is largely Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, ethnically identical with their Soviet brothers. For centuries, these nomadic peoples roamed this entire region, which became an area of Russian-Chinese confrontation in the 19th century. The present border was established in 1884.³³ During the repressive years of the 1930's, as many as half a million Central Asians fled the Soviet Union into Xinjiang.³⁴

In the post-war era, the Soviets developed a strong base of influence in Xinjiang, with an active consulate in Kuldja and broad contacts among the largely autonomous Xinjiang rulers. As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviets apparently used their position to try to subvert Chinese control. The Kuldja consulate issued thousands of Soviet passports to Chinese Kazakhs and Uighurs. The Chinese responded by closing the consulate and greatly increasing the influx of Chinese into the region, with over a million resettling there in the late 1950's. This influx of Chinese and repressive measures against the indigenous population spurred another mass migration, this time from Xinjiang into the Soviet Union and involving perhaps 50,000 Kazakhs. The Chinese purged pro-Soviet officials and laid claim to thousands of square miles of Soviet territory.³⁵

Since then, the border has been closed, effectively cutting direct linkages by mass population movement. There have, though, been continuous reports of skirmishes and intrusions,³⁶ so some direct personal linkages apparently still exist. Additionally, there has been a thriving propaganda war, with each side accusing the other of suppressing its Muslim minorities while asserting that its own minority population enjoys wide privileges.³⁷ These form direct outputs from each side, though it is an open question what attention their intended recipients give to them. But even without a direct response, these broadcasts certainly give each side an impetus to avoid minority dissatisfactions which the other side could exploit. In fact, the treatment of the minorities serves as an indirect

output by each side, an output which the propaganda broadcasts insure will not be ignored. The Soviets have even reportedly formed a Uighur National Liberation Council in Exile,⁴³ and Uighur literature has undergone a modest resurgence.⁴⁴ Additionally, there is a widespread practice of unofficial Islam among the Soviet Uighurs, particularly those who have most recently come from Xinjiang.⁴⁵ Overall, then, there is quite a variety of cross-border linkages between Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang. Any widespread dissatisfaction among the Soviet Muslims would certainly be used by the Chinese for propaganda purposes both to Soviet Muslims and to the Muslim world.⁴⁶ More disturbing to the Soviets though is undoubtedly the potential for Chinese instigation or support of unrest or even active insurgency. These considerations give the Soviets a strong incentive to avoid any growth of Muslim unrest in Central Asia.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan was long an isolated and fiercely independent buffer state on the Soviet border. During the 1920's a number of the anti-Soviet guerrilla movements in Central Asia operated from Afghanistan, and when they were finally suppressed in 1926, remnants returned there.⁴⁷ For 40 years, the border remained reasonably well sealed and the Soviets appeared content to have modest ties with an Afghanistan largely isolated from Western influence. This changed in April 1978, when a violent coup established a pro-Communist government under Nur Mohammed Taraki, who quickly turned to the Soviets for support. Since then it appears that the Soviets had a hand in the preparation of the coup. They became a major force in the country, with up to 6,000 military advisors and high level visitors, including Army General A.A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate and a key figure in the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion. The Taraki government proceeded ruthlessly against traditional elements, with widespread arrests and thousands of executions reported.⁴⁸ What this succeeded in doing was alienating large sections of the population and spawning a widespread insurgency among traditionalist Muslim elements whose anti-Russian anger reportedly resulted in hundreds of deaths among Soviet advisors. When the Soviets apparently attempted to form a more moderate Afghan government, the result instead was the seizure of power by an uncompromising Marxist, Hafizullah Amin. The crescendo of

resistance rose to the point where there was a serious threat of the government actually falling to an anti-Soviet, fundamentalist Muslim grouping."

The Soviets reacted by a massive invasion of the country in December 1979, resulting in the death of Amin, installing Babrak Karmal as the new Afghan President and using Soviet ground forces to help the disintegrating Afghan Army reestablish order in the countryside. While the reasons for the Soviet intervention are speculative, concern over rising Muslim unrest on the border appears to have been an important consideration.¹⁰ At the risk of a strong Western reaction—which they apparently underestimated—the Soviets have become involved in a military operation which has brought them overwhelming censure by both the United Nations¹¹ and the Islamic Conference, whose condemnation included a call for other Islamic states "to affirm their solidarity with the Afghan people in their just struggle to safeguard their faith, national independence and territorial integrity and to recover their right to determine their destiny."¹²

These events are closely linked to the Soviet Muslims. There is, first of all, the indirect linkage of the example of Afghan Muslim insurgents fighting a Soviet sponsored Marxist government and of the UN and Islamic Conference condemnations of Soviet actions against Muslim insurgents. Additionally, a number of the Soviet troops involved are Soviet Muslims, particularly since some of the units involved were reportedly from Central Asia and used local reservists to fill their ranks prior to the invasion.¹³ By Soviet law, these reservists can be held on active duty only for a restricted period of time. Thus any protracted conflict will require the rotation of troops and the direct involvement of more Soviet Muslims not only participating in the actual events, but talking with the Afghans in their own language and being able, on their return home, to spread first hand accounts throughout Soviet Central Asia. Furthermore, many Soviet casualties are being returned to Central Asia. Judging by casualty reports from Afghanistan, they include several hundred dead and perhaps two thousand wounded.¹⁴ These casualties provide another direct input from Afghanistan to Central Asia. Furthermore these inputs are being intensified by indirect inputs through increased Central Asia broadcasting by the Voice of America and Radio Liberty¹⁵ and undoubtedly also by Chinese radio propaganda.

On the other side of the ledger, a sizable number of Soviet civilians have accompanied the invasion forces into Afghanistan and are supervising civil government operations. These Soviet civilians include officials who have had long experience in overseeing Soviet Muslims and channeling their energies into productive activities. But how effective they will be in Afghanistan is open to question. There is a potential for protracted anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare and for Afghan disaffection to spread into the Soviet forces, bringing possible desertions of Soviet troops or friction between Muslim and Slavic elements.¹⁴ While it is too early to judge the long-term effects of the intervention, there will certainly be an increased awareness by Soviet Muslims of conditions in the Muslim world beyond their border. The intervention marks the first time since the closing of the Soviet-Xinjiang border that there have been large scale, direct linkages between Soviet Muslims and neighboring Muslim regions. And Afghanistan, although remote, is not nearly so remote as Xinjiang; it does have contacts through both Pakistan and Iran with the outside world.

Iran

Direct Russian involvement in Iran dates from the early 19th century when Czarist troops forced Iran to cede Georgia and portions of Armenia to Russian control. This historic interest in Iran was rekindled in a 1907 agreement between Russia and Great Britain dividing Iran into spheres of influence. Both these countries stationed troops in Iran during World War I. Although most of the Russian forces were withdrawn during the 1917 Russian Revolution, postwar anarchy in Iran allowed Bolshevik troops to set up a short-lived Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan, including much of the Iranian Caspian Sea coast. But in 1921, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship with Iran and withdrew its troops. This treaty allowed the Soviets to reinsert troops into Iran if it were used as a base of activities against the Soviet government.

During World War II, Iran was again unable to maintain a neutral stance and was simultaneously invaded by Great Britain and the Soviet Union on August 26, 1941. For the remainder of the war Iran was a key route for Allied assistance to the Soviet Union. Under these wartime conditions, a strongly leftist Tudeh Party was established with Soviet backing. In December 1945 the Soviets

backed leftist declarations of an autonomous state of Azarbaijan and a neighboring Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Soviet military and political influence in support of Tudeh Party agitations threatened to bring the whole of Iran under Soviet domination. However, with British and American backing the Shah suppressed the Tudeh Party and Iranian troops reoccupied the secessionist areas in December 1946. Nevertheless, a strong leftist influence on the government remained until the military ousted Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and placed the Shah in firm control of the country on August 19, 1953. Relations between the Soviet Union and Iran after the fall of Mossadegh were correct but not cordial, with gradually increasing commercial and political contacts in the 1970's." In particular, Iran began supplying most of the natural gas requirements of Soviet Azerbaidzhan, with Soviet gas in turn diverted to East European customers.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 practically neutralized the extensive Western influence in Iran and met with strong Soviet approbation. While it was clearly the religious supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini who were the driving force behind this revolution, other forces combined with the "Khomeini phenomenon" to bring down the Shah and transform the old order. Specifically dedicated urban Marxist guerrillas turned the tide against the Iranian armed forces in the final days of street fighting." The extent of direct Soviet involvement in the revolution is unclear. Soviet intelligence services have long operated in Iran and an anti-Western Radio of National Liberation has broadcast from Baku for a number of years. In the year preceding the Shah's downfall, a weekly Tudeh Party bulletin, *Navid*, made its appearance, apparently produced on presses in the Soviet Embassy. But while the Soviets worked to destabilize the situation in Iran, there is no direct evidence of actual involvement in the revolutionary events."

Two particular aspects of the Iranian Revolution which have broad implications for the Soviet Union are Muslims and minorities. The Soviets have downplayed the religious elements of the revolution, referring blandly to its "religious coloration" and asserting that the basic reasons for the disturbances are the corruption and abuses of power." They have also stressed the alleged compatibility of Marxism with Islam." Nevertheless, the Shiite Muslim doctrines of the Iranian Revolution pose awkward

problems for the Soviet Union. They are far removed from any portrayal of Islam as a conservative force; rather they fuse opposition to tyrannical government with resistance to foreign domination. This certainly feeds Soviet misgivings about the impact of such beliefs on Soviet Muslims, particularly the predominately Shiite Azerbaidzhanis.⁴² This is further complicated by Khomeini's own statements that the Islamic Republic knows no boundaries, and the calls of some of his supporters for sending Islamic preachers into the Soviet Union.⁴³ Not only has Iran set an example of Islamic revolt against an oppressive government, it has also continued to speak out for the religious rights of Soviet and Afghan Muslims.⁴⁴ Under these conditions, the Soviet Union can expect to have great difficulty maintaining cordial relations with Iran while actively suppressing Muslim dissent in Afghanistan, particularly if it spreads to Soviet Central Asia. It is also unclear as to what extent the Afghan rebel Muslims can draw support from Iran.

The ethnic minorities of Iran further complicate the question of Soviet relations. While the population of Iran's central plateau is remarkably homogeneous and comprises the majority of the total population of some 33 million, there is a great ethnic admixture in the frontier regions, including Azarbaijanis, Kurds, Turkomans, Baluchi and Arabs.⁴⁵

The Azarbaijanis number about 5 million. They are the largest minority in Iran and are concentrated in the border area directly below Soviet Azerbaidzhan. Both the abortive 1920 Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan and the 1945 autonomous state of Azarbaijan were located in this area. While there is undoubtedly a reservoir of Soviet influence in the area, there is also a reservoir of separatist sentiment. One of the most crucial splits to develop early in Iran's Islamic Republic was the boycott of national elections by the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, one of Iran's five Grand Ayatollahs and the unquestioned religious leader of Iranian Azarbaijan. Since then there has been frequent rioting in Azarbaijan and continuing pressure for autonomy.⁴⁶ While the Soviets have a potential to stir up unrest on the Iranian side of the border, this would certainly alienate the Teheran government. On the other hand, if an autonomous Iranian Azarbaijan develops, it would provide an obvious contrast to adjacent Soviet Azerbaidzhan and could easily raise pressures for Soviet concessions to their Muslims.

A similar situation exists in northeastern Iran, where some half a million seminomadic Turkomans share an ethnic heritage with the indigenous population of Soviet Turkemistan and the tribes of western Afghanistan. The Turkomans have been actively battling Iranian revolutionary forces for their own autonomous region.⁶⁷ An autonomous state in this region would not only contrast with its Soviet counterpart, but could also be a direct source of support for Muslim rebels in Afghanistan.

The Kurds in Iran number over 2 million and pose an even more difficult problem than either the Azarbaijanis or Turkomans. They are one of the largest minority groups in the Middle East, but have little recognized official status. Total population estimates are very rough, ranging around 10 million most of whom live in Jurdistan, a roughly defined area in the Soviet-Turkish-Iranian-Syrian-Iraqi border region. Almost half are in Turkey, which refuses to even recognize them as a separate ethnic group, bans the use of their language, and generally refers to them simply as "mountain Turks" or "Easterners." There are over 3 million in northwest Iran, and probably a slightly lower number in eastern Iraq. Smaller groups live in Syria (400,000) and the Soviet Union (89,000).⁶⁸ The Kurds have been persistent fighters for autonomy. In Iraq they have carried on a campaign for over two decades, initially (when Iraq was a pro-Western member of the Baghdad Pact) drawing support from the Soviet bloc.⁶⁹ Later Soviet equipment spearheaded Iraqi drives which cost thousands of lives while the Kurds drew support from Iran. Now within Iran's Islamic Republic, the Kurds were the first to fight for autonomy. Their religious leader, Sheik Ezzedin Hosseini also boycotted the Iranian elections. By heavy fighting the Kurds have apparently gained a good measure of de facto autonomy within the Islamic Republic.⁷⁰ An autonomous Iranian Kurdistan could be very destabilizing for both Turkey and Iraq, as well as having a potential for reflection within the Soviet Union.

The Baluchi live in the tri-border area of eastern Iran, western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. As with the Kurds, they have long agitated for an independent homeland. Many Baluchi leaders have strong leftist orientations and have drawn support from the Soviet Union. Now, with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, only Baluchistan separates the Soviets from warm water ports on the Arabian Sea. The possibility of eventually moving to secure this

area was probably one consideration behind the Soviet move into Afghanistan and has prompted much nervousness both in Pakistan and in Iran where armed clashes were reported in December 1979.⁷¹

Iran's Arab population of at least a half million is centered in Khuzhistan at the head of the Persian Gulf and Iran's oil production area. Strikes by the Arab workers were one of the critical elements in the downfall of the Shah, and the Arabs have continued their activism with demands for autonomy on the new Islamic Republic. Their religious leader, Ayatollah al-Shobel Khangani, also boycotted the national elections and there has been sporadic fighting and leftist agitation by the Arabs.⁷²

Overall, the situation in Iran is certainly complex. Its Islamic Republic projects an image of Islam which could easily spur an increased cultural awareness among the Soviet Muslims. On the other hand, the long-term stability of the Islamic Republic is questionable, especially in the presence of radical Marxist groups and with the unsettling activities of the country's minorities. These minorities include four sizable groups (Azarbaijanis, Turkomans, Kurds and Baluchi) with strong separatist movements. In the past, the Soviets have often given support to these movements and could do so again to undermine the stability of the Teheran government, or even as a pretext for intervention under the terms of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty, which the Soviets have openly referred to in recent months.⁷³ On the other hand, if the Islamic Republic is successful in defining spheres of autonomy for its minority groups, this would not only remove a basis for Soviet political or military intervention, but would also provide visible contrasts with the Soviet Muslim areas and could act to increase further the internal demands of Soviet Muslims. At this point, the only direct linkages across the Iranian-Soviet border are the Soviet radio broadcasts plus whatever clandestine support the Soviets are giving to leftist elements in Iran. But, as in Afghanistan, any direct Soviet involvement in Iran would greatly increase the direct linkages between Soviet and local Muslims.

Turkey

Turkey has a long history of conflict with Russian governments seeking an outlet to the Mediterranean. Additionally, a number of pan-Turkic movements have presented attractions for the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union—attractions strongly denounced since the 1920's but still not squelched.⁷⁴ Recently this staunchly anti-

Soviet country and strong member of NATO has undergone noticeable change, particularly following the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent deterioration of relations with the United States. The Soviets have taken advantage of this new mood in Turkey to build a modest rapprochement with the government.⁷⁵ At the same time, there has been a renewed leftist militancy among the Turkish Kurds.⁷⁶ Even in the past the Turkish government was reluctant to become involved in the question of Soviet political dissent, grudgingly giving minimal attention to Meskhetian appeals. Now in a climate of Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and against a Soviet potential for instigating unrest among Turkey's minority Kurds, the Turkish government is unlikely to provide any direct support for Soviet Muslim dissidents. However, growing cultural exchange programs provide a basis for open Turkish support of the increasing interest among Soviet Turkic peoples in their own cultural heritage. And certainly any harsh repression of Soviet Muslims would undermine the fragile Turkish-Soviet rapprochement which Moscow apparently views as an important vehicle for weakening the cohesiveness of NATO's southern flank.

The Third World

Although few Soviet Muslims share a common ethnic basis with the Arab world, this area was the basic source of their Muslim heritage. Indeed some use of the traditional Arabic script apparently still survives within religious portions of the Soviet Muslim community,⁷⁷ and the Soviets send carefully controlled and selected groups on pilgrimages to Muslim shrines and to various Muslim conferences.⁷⁸ While the Soviets have close relations with a number of modernizing Arab states, several of these governments (particularly Iraq and Libya) are strongly Muslim and have denounced the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. As such, Soviet Muslim policy is particularly relevant for Soviet relations with Arab states, providing a strong incentive not to further alienate them by obvious repression of Central Asian Muslims.

Overall, relations with the Third World significantly restrain the adoption of certain options for handling internal problems of Muslim assertiveness.⁷⁹ Curtailing Muslim access to key positions, dispersing Muslim workers throughout the Soviet Union, or suppressing the growing interest in the Soviet Muslim heritage would invite denunciations from neighboring Muslim states and

possibly even direct support for dissident Soviet Muslims. They would also undoubtedly draw direct Chinese criticism and complicate Soviet efforts to reduce Chinese influence in the Third World.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet Muslim population, concentrated in traditional homeland areas in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and adjacent regions, has a long history of Russian and then Soviet domination. When compared to its prerevolutionary conditions and to most of the neighboring (and ethnically related) countries, the Soviet Muslim areas have shown impressive development in terms of agricultural production, industrialization, education, and health services, though at a cost of a loss of local political control and expression. Furthermore, by comparison with the rest of the Soviet Union, the development of Central Asia does have some significant shortcomings, specifically in its continuing position as a net supplier of raw materials. There is also a continuing and highly visible Slavic domination of both economic and political life. Increased education has brought both a growing interest in the Soviet Muslim heritage and increased pressures for a larger share in the Soviet system.

These pressures are now combining with demographic trends which project large increases in the Muslim proportion of the Soviet work force, at the same time that the demands for labor will be greatest outside the traditionally Muslim areas. This will significantly increase job competition between Slavs and Muslims in Central Asia and will face the Soviet Union with a difficult problem of how to shift population resources to areas where they are needed without alienating workers and feeding dissatisfaction, dissent and possibly even open unrest among their Muslim population. Furthermore, the growing interest in their Muslim heritage works counter to Soviet goals for the development of a single, multinational Soviet people.

Even the brief survey above of Muslim areas bordering on Central Asia shows that there is a wide variety of linkages across the Soviet border. Overt cultural and tourist linkages, including pilgrimage groups, are all carefully controlled by the Soviets and are kept to a modest level. There are also direct economic linkages,

particularly in regard to Middle East energy sources. Already the Soviet bloc has felt the pinch of Iran's cutback in natural gas supplies. A worsening of Soviet ties with the Muslim world could greatly complicate the Soviet energy planning.

Additionally, there are clandestine direct linkages across the Soviet border, although there do not appear to be any significant remaining informal or spontaneous linkages between kindred Muslim groups astride the border. On the Sino-Soviet border, clandestine linkages appear to work both ways, giving each side a potential to instigate unrest among Muslim minorities and to provide active support to any dissident movements which might develop. Elsewhere along the Soviet border, such linkages appear to originate strictly in the Soviet Union and to be directed against local Muslim minorities, either across the Soviet border with Iran and Turkey, or through diplomatic missions.

Against this background, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is unique because it provides large scale direct inputs into Soviet Central Asia, inputs which are only partially under the control of the Soviet authorities. Central Asians in the invasion force get to see conditions in Afghanistan, speak with Afghanis in their own language and then return to Central Asia to spread their own version of events. As restricted as their experience might be, it is the first relatively large scale direct linkage into Soviet Central Asia since the Xinjiang migrations of the late 1950's. There is a potential not only for anti-Soviet Afghan rebels to draw support from Central Asians, but also for unrest to spread eventually into Central Asia, particularly if instability and fighting expand to other areas of the Soviet border.

In addition to established direct linkages, there are a number of incipient direct linkages where one side provides a direct output but there is no specific recipient. These include Soviet radio broadcasts to all the neighboring countries; broadcasts into Central Asia by China, the Voice of America, and Radio Liberty; and various cross-border appeals, such as the Iranian appeals for broader religious rights for Soviet Muslims and the Islamic Conference appeal for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. While the impact of these direct outputs is largely unmeasurable, they do act to spread a general awareness of broader indirect linkages.

These broad indirect linkages—example set by social, political and economic conditions on both sides of the border—form the

bulk of the linkages across the Soviet border. They have a number of implications for Soviet foreign policy, particularly in regard to the Third World.

The Soviet appeal to the Third World heavily stresses Central Asian development as a model for wide application. Any widespread dissatisfaction or unrest in this area would seriously undermine this appeal.

Islam is a major political force in South Asia and the Middle East. The Soviet Union professes that its own Muslims enjoy wide religious freedom, but unrest in Central Asia would visibly tarnish this claim. Furthermore, the growing militancy of Islam along the Soviet borders has a potential to reflect within the Soviet Muslim population and increase pressures for equality of opportunity and development of local cultural heritages.

Militant Islamic movements such as the Iranian revolution and the Afghan opposition set an example of Muslim resistance to tyranny and oppression which could encourage open unrest on the part of Soviet Muslims.

Autonomous regions which are developing in Iran could have a strong influence on their neighboring Soviet regions. While the Soviet Union has in the past supported separatist movements to help undermine unfriendly or hostile governments, separatist movements not under Soviet influence which establish autonomous regions could be disturbing sources of ideological contamination.

Although the human rights movement has to this point been largely a concern of the Western powers and has found its major international expression in the Helsinki Final Act, there is also a Third World interest in this subject. Repression in Soviet Central Asia would probably draw loud denunciations not only from the West but from China and the Third World as well.

The net result of these various linkages with Soviet Muslims is that foreign policy considerations constrain the Soviet Union's options in solving its internal political problems. Furthermore, Soviet foreign policy actions can help strengthen internal trends (such as a broad development of local culture and the growth of common ties between Muslim ethnic groups) which work against basic goals of assimilation to a common Soviet (largely Russian) culture and continued domination of the Soviet system by ethnic Russians. Therefore Soviet foreign policy, particularly toward the Muslim world, must be carefully coordinated with internal policies in Soviet Central Asia.

ENDNOTES

1. Richard V. Weeks, ed., *Muslim Peoples*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978, p. 527, cites a total world Muslim population of 719,721,000. Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, "Islam and Military Power," *Military Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 11, November 1979, p. 72, cites 800 million Muslims.
2. Weeks, pp. xxiii-xxx.
3. Flora Lewis, "Upsurge in Islam," *The New York Times*, December 28, 29, 30 and 31, 1979.
4. The theory of linkages between national and international systems is only weakly developed. The terminology and relationships used here is that proposed by James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press, 1971, pp. 307-338.
5. The 9,195,000 Uzbeks constituted the third largest ethnic group in the 1970 Soviet population of 241,720,000. Other major Muslim peoples included Tatars (5,931,000), Kazakhs (5,299,000), Azerbaidzhani (4,380,000), Tadzhiks (2,136,000), Chuvash (1,694,000), Turkmens (1,525,000), Kirghiz (1,452,000), Dagestanis (1,365,000), Mordvinians (1,263,000) and Bashkirs (1,240,000). The total population of Muslim peoples was close to 40 million, or about one sixth of the total population. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let (National Economy of the USSR for 60 Years)*, Moscow: Statistika Publishing House, 1977, p. 41. In this context, "Muslim" refers to ethnic and cultural origins, it does not necessarily reflect present religious orientation.
6. Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapaway, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 127-128. In later remarks ("Population and Manpower Trends in the U.S.S.R.") delivered October 31, 1978, at the Kennan Institute (Washington, D.C.) Conference on Soviet Central Asia, Feshbach estimated that one quarter of the projected Soviet population in the year 2000 would be of Muslim origin and less than half would be Russians. His conclusions are based on tables in: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Population Projections by Age and Sex: For the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the U.S.S.R.—1970 to 2000*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979. Unfortunately, all this analysis is based on 1970 census data; the 1979 census data is only beginning to become available (see, for example: Joint Publications Research Service No. 74505, *USSR Trade and Services*, November 1, 1979, p. 50, and *The New York Times*, February 28, 1980).
7. Gregory J. Massell, "Modernization and Nationality Policy in Soviet Central Asia" in *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, ed. by Paul Cocks et al., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 281-285; Jeremy R. Azrael and Steven L. Burg, *Political Participation and Ethnic Conflict in Soviet Central Asia*, paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Central Asia, International Communications Agency, Washington, DC, October 31, 1978, pp. 1, 9-11.
8. Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966, pp. 118-136. This work also gives extensive data on the origins of the various ethnic groups. See also: Karl H. Menges, "People, Languages, and Migrations," in *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. by Edward Allworth,

New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 92-130 and Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1957, pp. 4-83; Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Dubour Editions, 1966; Weeks, pp. 210-226, 389-400, 451-469.

9. Detailed accounts of this early Russian expansion are in: Allworth, Chapters 4-7; Krader, pp. 97-109; Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968; Michael Rywkin, *Russia in Central Asia*, New York: Collier Books, 1963, pp. 15-32; Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964, pp. 48-96.

10. Establishing control and crushing independent minded local Communists were complex and lengthy tasks for the new Soviet state and involved widespread fighting among constantly shifting elements. See: Rywkin, pp. 33-62; Allworth, Chapters 8-10; Charles Warren Hostler, pp. 146-168; Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967, pp. 65-164; William Mandel, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, New York: Dial Press, Inc., 1944, pp. 105-118.

11. Donald S. Carlisle ("Modernization, Generations and the Uzbek Soviet Intelligensia," in Cocks, pp. 239-264) gives a detailed analysis of this process in Uzbekistan. For parallel actions in other Muslim areas, see: Rywkin, pp. 101-118 (general) and pp. 119-152 (also on Uzbekistan); US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *The Soviet Empire*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1965, pp. 47-61; Wheeler, pp. 117-136.

12. Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 189-201; Rywkin, pp. 85-100; Hostler, pp. 156-170.

13. Bacon, pp. 189-217; Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, pp. 123-164; Wheeler, *The Peoples*, pp. 93-111; *The Soviet Empire*, pp. 52-65, 109-114; John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 3-36.

14. Alec Nove and J.A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967, pp. 39-54, 67-85.

15. Carlisle, p. 262; See also Herwig Kraus, "Leading Organs of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 49/78, February 24, 1978.

16. *Ibid.*, also John Hanselman, "Leadership and Nationality: A Comparison of Uzbekistan and Kirgizia" in *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, ed. by Edward Allworth, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 100-109. Russian Second Secretaries, though, are still a consistent occurrence; see Christian Duevel, "Changing Patterns in the Top 'Watchdog' Appointments to the Union Republics," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 365/76, July 28, 1976; Miller, p. 35.

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18. Nove and Newth, Chapter 8.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-122; Geoffrey Jukes, *The Soviet Union in Asia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 48-49.

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51-64, 91-104; Hans-Jurgen Wagner, "The RSFSR and the Non-Russian Republics; An Economic Comparison," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, undated (but issued in 1968); Albert Boiter, "Educational Levels of Soviet Nationalities Compared," *ibid.*, June 28, 1973; Theodore Shabad, "Central Asia and the Soviet Economy: Implications for Policy," paper presented October 31, 1978, at the Kennan Institute (Washington, DC) Conference on Soviet Central Asia, pp. 2, 10.

21. Feshbach and Rapaway, pp. 127-128; Kevin Klose, "Central Asia's Population Growing," *The Washington Post*, January 2, 1979; Shabad, p. 17.

22. Massell, pp. 275-278, 287-288; there are already numerous indications of under-employment among indigenous workers, see, for example: "Squatters in Kirgizia," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 252/78, November 14, 1978; "Reports of Unemployment in Uzbekistan," *ibid.*, No. 424/76, September 29, 1976; Shabad, pp. 6-8, 17.

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26. John Soper, "Uzbek Writers Look to the Past for Inspiration," *ibid.*, No. 129/79, April 24, 1979; William Reese, "Soviet Literacy Policy and the Preservation of the Lyrical Arts," *ibid.*, No. 78/75, February 21, 1975.

27. John Soper, "Problems in Publishing the Kirghiz Epic *Manas*," *ibid.*, No. 221/78, October 10, 1978.

28. Tania Jacques, "The Central Asian Cinema: Politics and Aesthetics," *ibid.*, No. 164/75, April 18, 1975.

29. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Integration and Ethnic Nationalism in the Soviet Union: Aspects, Trends and Problems," in *Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: A Soviet Dilemma*, ed. by Carl A. Linden and Dimitri Simes, a Joint Symposium sponsored by Georgetown University and George Washington University, Washington, October 20, 1976, pp. 34-36; see also: Tura Kamal, "Ethnolinguistic Self-Expression in the Tatar SSR," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 523/75, December 17, 1975; Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, Chapter 8.

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38. "Sinkiang in the Modern World," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 46, Part I, February 1969, pp. 42-44.

39. Wheeler, *Modern History*, pp. 176-177.

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41. See, for example: *U.S. News and World Report*, January 6, 1964, pp. 53-54; *International Herald Tribune*, August 7 and 8, 1967; *The New York Times*, July 27, 1979; Joachim Glaubitz, "Soviet Politics Regarding China and Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1976, p. 498; Michael Parks, "Rising Tensions Likely Along Sino-Soviet Border," *Baltimore Sun*, August 8, 1979.

42. Typical materials on this propaganda war are: "Ili's Ten Fruitful Years," *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 11, 1964, pp. 5, 26; Suleyman Tekiner, "Sinkiang and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Bulletin* (Munich), Vol. 14, No. 8, August 1967, pp. 9-16; Bukhara Ryshkanbayev, "Eto—neprikrity shovinism (This is Blatant Chauvinism)," *Liturnaya Gazeta*, September 26, 1963, p. 4; "War of Nerves," *Newsweek*, Vol. 59, No. 10, March 6, 1967, pp. 33-34; "Review of Sinkiang Affairs Based on Chinese Press and Radio," *The Central Asian Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1967, pp. 88-92; "Soviet Broadcasts in Uygur for Sinkiang," *ibid.*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1967, pp. 284-286; John Soper, "Is the Soviet Union Interested in Playing the Uigur Card?" *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 69/79, March 1, 1979; David R. Staats, "The Uighur Press and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *ibid.*, No. 147/77, June 15, 1977.

43. David R. Staats, "Sinkiang and 'The China Card,'" *ibid.*, No. 171/79, July 14, 1977, p. 3; see also Tura Kamal, "Translation of Uighur Authors into Russian and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *ibid.*, No. 214/75, May 23, 1975.

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53. Peter Kruzhin, "The Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, No. 20/80, January 11, 1980.
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55. *Ibid.*, January 10, 1980.
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60. *Moskovskaya Pravda*, November 22, 1978, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: USSR International Affairs*, November 29, 1978, p. F-2; *Kommunist* (Yerevan), December 7, 1978, *ibid.*, December 14, 1978, p. F-7.
61. Richard Sim, "Muhammad and Marx: The Explosive Mixture," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 8, No. 5, March 8, 1979, pp. 4-5.
62. Ayoob, pp. 542-544.
63. Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani has called at least twice for the distribution of Islamic writings in the Soviet Union and permission for Islamic preachers to travel in the Soviet Muslim republics. "The USSR This Week," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 181/79, June 11, 1979 and No. 190/79, June 18, 1979.
64. See, for example: "Iranian Says Soviet Aims to Split Nation," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1980. Reportedly, Ayatollah Khomeini has also complained to the Soviet Ambassador over Soviet involvement in Iran, and then broadcast the criticism over the Iranian State Radio; "The USSR This Week," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 190/79, June 18, 1979 and *The New York Times*, June 13, 1979.

65. John Kofner, "Iran is Harried by Persistent Resistance of Its Minorities," *The New York Times*, April 11, 1979; Nyrop, p. 72; *Iran Almanac*, Tehran: Echoprint, 1975, pp. 395, 428-429.

66. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Election in Iran: Khomeini's Victory May Prove Costly," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1979; see also December 7 and 10, 1979.

67. John Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of Tribal Separatism," *The New York Times*, March 28, 1979, and "Iran Promising Special Attention to Ethnic Demands," *ibid.*, March 29, 1979.

68. Ismet Vanly, a Kurdish representative, discussed several estimates (*The Revolution of Iraki Kurdistan*, Part I, Committee for the Defense of the Kurdish People's Rights, April 1965, pp. 4-5) and comes to a total of 13 million. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, an Iranian Kurdish leader, also examines various estimates (*Kurdistan and the Kurds*, Prague: Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, 1965, tr. Mirian Jelinkova, London: Collet's Holdings, Ltd., pp. 19-24) and reaches a total of 10,450,000. The *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entisklopedia (Large Soviet Encyclopedia)*, Vol. 24, p. 90, gives a 1953 total of seven million Kurdish speakers. Charles Cremeans (*The Arabs and the World*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963, p. 76) gives under five million.

69. The short-lived Mahabad government was one early example of Soviet support for separatist Kurds in an era when Soviet relations with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey were all poor. In the 1950's, the Kurdish separatist leader Mustafa Barzini and several hundred of his followers were given asylum in the Soviet Union, (Israel T. Naamani, "Kurdish Driver for Self Determination," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1966, p. 288) and support for a radio and propaganda campaign including a treatise published by the Czechoslovak Academy of Science supporting an independent Kurdistan (Ghassemlou).

70. Ibrahim, p. 4, see also: William Braingin, "Kurdish Unrest Adds to Woes of Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 21, 1978; John Kofner, "Iran Promising Special Attention to Ethnic Demands," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1979, and "Iranian Troops Move Into Position to Fight Kurds' Autonomy Quest," *ibid.*, December 7, 1979.

71. Christopher S. Wren, "In New Ethnic Violence in Iran, Baluchis Battle Persians," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1979; see also: William Branigan, "Baluchi Harbor a Lure to Soviets," *The Washington Post*, February 9, 1979.

72. Ibrahim, p. 4; William Branigan, "Iranian Arabs, Khomeini Forces Clash Violently," *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1979; see also August 24, 1979.

73. Craig W. Whitney, "Moscow Gambles in Iran," *The New York Times*, January 27, 1979.

74. Tura Kamal, "Renewed Criticism of Sultan-Galievism," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 141/76, March 17, 1976.

75. Marian Leighton, "Soviet-Turkish Friendship: Implications for the West," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 217/77, September 20, 1977; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Confidence Game," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 1979.

76. Sam Cohen, "Turkey Watches Its Kurds," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 10, 1979.

77. Robin and Michelle Poulton, p. 304.

78. Violet Conolly, "'Jubilee Year' in Central Soviet Asia," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 58, Part II, January 1971, p. 167; *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 8, No. 14, July 12, 1979, p. 4; *USSR and the Third World*, Vol. 8, 1978, No. 2 and 3, p. 59.

79. Massell, pp. 281-287.

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